Professor Sudduth

Philosophy 110

Aristotle: Handout #2

Aristotle: The Nature of Friendship

1. Three Things Worthy of Affection

Friendship is of great importance in Aristotle’s moral and social philosophy. This is based partly on the fact that becoming virtuous and living the good life depends on the kind of community one exists in and the sort of relationships one has with other people. Moreover, friendship is also intrinsically good since it represents a development or perfection of the human person as a rational animal, what Aristotle would call a good of the soul. Rational beings love to talk to others, and it is from such shared discourse that friendships emerge.

Aristotle begins his discussion on friendship by getting clear about what humans like or to what they are attracted. His reason for this is twofold: (i) friendship is ordinarily taken to involve an affection and (ii) initially, we have a better understanding about what we are attracted to and what we like than what friendship is.

Humans do not feel affection for everything, but only for what is lovable. Aristotle locates three things which are worthy of human affection: (a) the useful, (b) the pleasant, and the good (in itself). The useful is loved because it is a MEANS to either pleasure or the good, and so human affection is directed to two kinds of ENDS, the pleasant or the good. Since some things only appear good but in fact are not good, Aristotle thinks it is sufficient to say that what APPEARS good will be worthy of affection.

2. Philia and Three Types of Friendship

· Philia (friendship): The word translated “friendship” is used by Aristotle to refer to a very broad range of social relationships (e.g., husband-wife relations, parent-child relations, business relations) where some end or activity (e.g., pleasure, utility, or the good) is shared or common between both parties.

· The basic qualities of friendship

· A reciprocal affection (or attraction) between (at least) two people.

· A reciprocal willing of the good or well wishing between (at least) two people.

· A shared awareness of the good will of each other.

· Whereas a sense of mutual obligation among individuals is the distinctive mark of “justice,” a sense of mutual concern among individuals is the distinctive mark of “friendship.” Justice asks us to give what is due to others; friendship asks us to give what we can. The sharing of certain ends and/or activities disposes people to express selective concern for each other. The nature and intensity of the concern depends on the type of ends shared.

· We may wish another person’s good for three reasons:

· Affection or love motivated by one’s own good where the other person is USEFUL. (friendships of utility)

· Affection or love motivated by one’s own good where the other person is PLEASANT to oneself. (friendships of pleasure)

· Affection or love motivated by the good of the other person, or wishing ANOTHER PERSON’S GOOD for their sake. (friendships of virtue)

In friendships of pleasure and utility, the person wishes another well but does so because of self-interest, because the other person gives one pleasure or is useful. Friendships of utility and pleasure are egoist or egocentric in nature. By contrast, in friendships of virtue a person wishes another well for the other person’s sake. Friendships of virtue are altruistic in character. Each of the three motivations for well wishing corresponds to the kinds of ends we can share with others.

3. Good Will and Friendship

Goodwill is distinct from friendship, though it resembles it and is included in it.

(a) Friendship requires knowledge of each other, but good will can be extended toward people whom we do not know.

(b) Friendship requires affection (since it requires a certain intensity of desire) but good will is not the same as affection. Affection is passive (being moved); good will is an activity of will (moving).

(c) Friendship requires intimacy, and therefore time. Good will can be extended suddenly, and so does not require intimacy or time.

Good will seems to be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure of seeing someone is the beginning of love. We must first come to feel good will if we are to become friends. Good will is undeveloped friendship. Good will plus intimacy leads to friendship (at least in shared virtue friendships). In friendships of utility and pleasure, good will is consequent to seeing the person as useful or pleasant. The object of good will is not the person but the person as useful or pleasant.

4. Kinds of People and Kinds of Friendships

(a) Friendships of Utility characterize the elderly and middle-aged because pleasure is not a strong impulse in the elderly and the middle aged are seeking to get ahead in life and thus pursue associations for advantage.

(b) Friendships of Pleasure characterize the young because the young are regulated by their feelings and their chief interest is in their own pleasure and the opportunity of the moment.