Professor Sudduth

Philosophy 110

Aristotle: Handout #4

Aristotle: Conflicts in Friendship

1. The Problem of Equality or Inequality in Friendship

Friendship between equals involves both parties receiving the same benefits or wishing the same good, or else receiving one thing for another (e.g., pleasure for help). But not everyone is equally useful, pleasant, or virtuous. How can they be friends?

(a) "Friendship consists more in loving than in being loved."

(b) Equality can be established if there is the appropriate affection toward each other that is reflective of the status (or merits) of each person. There must be a return proportionate to inferiority or superiority of each person. (See pages 270-272, and 281)

(i) Between equals, equal affection must be given.

(ii) Between unequals, the inferior must show greater affection. Why? Because the object of affection is the good, pleasant, or useful, and so the more good, pleasant, or useful a person is the more he or she must be loved (if he or she is loved for one of these qualities). (p. 272)

In essence, equality is retained by making up in affection the deficiency one has in goodness, pleasantness, or utility.

(c) In some cases (such as in mixed friendships), our deficiency with respect to one excellence is compensated for by having a superiority in another excellence. So person A may be more pleasant than person B, but person B may be more useful than person A. (pp. 280-81)

2. Complaints in Friendships

(a) Complaints and quarrels arise mainly in

(i) Friendships of utility because each associates with the other for their own benefit and each person is always wanting the better end of the bargain, and each thinks that they have less than they should have and are upset because they do not get as much as they want, even though they may deserve it. (pp. 281-283).

(ii) Friendships between unequals because each party may expect to get more. The better person deserves to be loved more, and if he or she isn't, quarrels arise and the friendship may end. The inferior person may desire to be loved more than he or she ought (though not deserving), and complaints then emerge in the friendship and it may breakup. (pp. 284-285)

(iii) Friendships between bad men because men with a bad character will easily deceive, make unreasonable demands, use others as a means to an end, or commit slander. (p. 272).

(iv) Friendships involving mixed or unrecognized motives for in that case one may no longer be loved (because he ceases to be pleasant) while he continuing to love the other (because he or she is still useful), or one simply misunderstands why he is loved altogether and is upset when faced with the prospects for the termination of the friendship. (pp. 286-89, 291-292).

(b) Complaints and quarrels are not likely in

(i) Friendships of shared pleasure because pleasure is a non-negotiable quality. One does not bargain to have one's friend be more pleasant. If one is not pleasant the friendship tends to end on its own. But as long as it exists, each is satisfied.

(ii) Friendships of shared virtue because each person is good, concerned more for the other than him or herself, and eager to please.

3. Grounds for Dissolving a Friendship

(a) It is right and reasonable to dissolve shared-advantage and shared-pleasure friendships when individuals in question no longer have the attributes (of utility or pleasantness) which motivated the friendship, provided that neither persons pretend to love each other for their character (a pretension of shared-virtue friendship).

(b) One ought to dissolve a friendship when a person A, who had accepted B as a good man, learns that B is (or becomes) a bad person. One simply ought not to love what is bad. But in cases where the person is capable of recovery, the friendship should not be broken off immediately, as the good person can assist the bad person toward virtue.

(c) It is not possible to remain friends with someone when one remains the same and the other improves and becomes superior in virtue. More generally, the development of significant differences in interests and likes makes friendship impossible.

(d) A former friend should not (after a breaking off of a friendship) necessarily be treated as though he were never a friend. A memory of the former intimacy is good and we should have consideration for former friends (more than strangers) for old time sake, provided that grave wickedness was not the occasion of dissolve.